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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, the Minnesota Legislature enacted statute section 171.177,
which required blood and urine tests to determine blood alcohol
concentrations be supported by a valid search warrant. 1 Under this statute,
drivers subjected to a warranted chemical test may lawfully refuse to submit
fluid samples and thwart the administration of the chemical test. Thus,
drivers suspected of DWI must decide whether they will comply with the
search warrant and submit a fluid sample that may adversely affect their
interests in subsequent criminal proceedings or, alternatively, exercise the
lawful option of refusal. Despite this critical and binding decision, in State
v. Rosenbush, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend Minnesota’s
Constitutional limited right to counsel to warranted chemical tests. 2 The
1
2

2017 Minn. Laws, ch. 83, art. 2, § 10 (effective July 1, 2017); MINN. STAT. 171.177 (2019).
931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019).
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Court’s decision rendered irrelevant, in effect, its previous holding in
Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety 3 recognizing a state
constitutional limited right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to
chemical testing pursuant to Minnesota’s implied consent law. 4
This note first reviews the history of implied consent laws, with a
particular focus on Minnesota’s implied consent law. 5 Next, it reviews the
history and objectives behind the protection of the right to counsel under
both the United States’ and Minnesota’s Constitutions. 6 It then provides a
synopsis of State v. Rosenbush 7 by considering the holding and reasoning
employed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 8 the Minnesota Supreme
Court, 9 and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s dissenting opinion. 10 Lastly, it
concludes that the statute at issue in Rosenbush is flawed and explores how
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning fails to adequately support its
holding. 11
This note suggests that the reasoning behind the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Rosenbush is inconsistent with precedent.
Rosenbush frustrates the general principles of the limited right to counsel
recognized in Friedman by denying a driver suspected of DWI access to
counsel prior to the deciding whether he or she will submit to the warranted
blood or urine test. Additionally, this note suggests that Minnesota Statute
section 171.177 is generally inconsistent with the search warrant
requirement insofar as it affords drivers the legal option to decline a
warranted test. These inconsistencies produce a new, unique decision
presented to drivers and create additional problems with regards to
Minnesota’s limited right to counsel.

473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991).
Id. at 835. In Friedman, the court recognized a “limited” right to counsel because the
“exercise of this right cannot ‘unreasonably delay the administration of the test.’” Rosenbush,
931 N.W.2d at 96 n.4 (quoting Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 421, 247 N.W.2d 385,
394 (1976)).
See infra Part II(a).
See infra Part II(b).
931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019).
See infra Part III(b).
See infra Part III(c).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
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II. HISTORY

A. Minnesota’s Implied Consent Law
In 1911, the Minnesota Legislature first recognized the dangers of
drunk driving and made “driving while in an intoxicated condition”
(“DWI”) a misdemeanor. 12 At that time, law enforcement’s only tool for
determining whether a driver was under the influence of alcohol was his
own observations, similar to today’s field sobriety tests. 13 In 1954, the
Breathalyzer was developed, which allowed law enforcement to estimate a
driver’s blood alcohol concentration using chemical oxidation and
photometry to measure alcohol vapors in a person’s breath. 14 Until the late
1960s, most American courts were lenient with DWI prosecutions and
generally would not prosecute a driver for DWI unless his or her blood
alcohol concentration was above 0.15. 15
OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA IMPAIRED
DRIVING FACTS, 50 (2017). Today, a person’s first DWI offense with a BAC under 0.18
constitutes a misdemeanor. A person’s first DWI offense with a BAC over 0.18 is punished
as a gross misdemeanor. Four or more DWI offenses constitutes a felony. See id. at 60, 63.
History of the Breathalyzer, GUARDIAN INTERLOCK (Dec. 16, 2014),
https://guardianinterlock.com/blog/history–breathalyzer/ [https://perma.cc/J7ZH–4YYG]
(officers looked for bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol, and whether the driver could walk
in a straight line or touch his or her nose—much like today’s field sobriety tests).
Douglas Martin, Robert F. Borkenstein, 89, Inventor of the Breathalyzer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
17, 2002) https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/17/us/robert–f–borkenstein–89–inventor–of–
the–breathalyzer.html [https://perma.cc/JC6S-E74C]; see also Wayne A. Morris, A New
Look at Breath Alcohol Testing, 33 CHAMPION 44 (2009).
See Robert B. Voas, Tara Kelley-Baker, Eduardo Romano & Radha Vishnuvajjala,
12

13

14

15

Implied-Consent Laws: A Review of the Literature and Examination of Current Problems
and Related Statutes, 40 J SAFETY RES. 1, 2 (2009); Matt Novak, Drunk Driving and the Pre–
History
of
Breathalyzers,
GIZMODO
(Dec.
31,
2013),
https://paleofuture.gizmodo.com/drunk–driving–and–the–pre–history–of–breathalyzers–
1474504117 [https://perma.cc/7KAJ–2N2M]. Most legislatures implemented blood alcohol
concentration standards based on guidelines determined by a 1938 study by the National
Safety Council and the American Medical Association. Id. A special committee of the
American Medical Association (Committee to Study Problems of Motor Vehicle Accidents)
established the following chemical standards for the legal interpretation of ‘under the
influence of alcohol’:
Below 0.05 percent alcohol in the blood: no influence of alcohol within the meaning of the
law.
Between 0.05 and 0.15 percent, a liberal, wide zone: alcoholic influence usually is present,
but courts of law are advised to consider the behavior of the individual and circumstances
leading to the arrest in making their decision.
0.15 percent: definite evidence of under the influence, since every individual with this
concentration would have lost a measurable extent some of the clearness of intellect and
control of himself that he would normally.
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Starting in 1968, Americans began to understand the dangers of
drunk driving. A study conducted by the U.S. Department of
Transportation found that almost half of the nation’s automobile fatalities
involved alcohol. 16 However, the real change occurred in 1980 with the
emergence of social activists groups. 17 Following the killing of her 13-yearold daughter by a drunk driver, Candy Lightner founded Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (“MADD”). 18 MADD’s mission was to advocate for stricter
DWI laws and to stigmatize drunk driving. 19 Eventually, American society
began vilifying drunk drivers. 20
Compelled by the social interest to protect Americans against drunk
drivers, lawmakers strengthened drinking and driving laws. 21 In an effort to
control the persistent concern of drunk driving, all fifty states today have
enacted implied consent statutes based on the principle that driving is a
privilege and not a right. 22 These laws specify that persons operating a motor
vehicle agree to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to
determine alcohol or drug content. 23 These statutes are utilized to serve the
legitimate public policy of convicting drunk drivers, but the constitutionality
of these statutes has been challenged. 24
NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, A HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ALCOHOL AND OTHER
DRUGS
8
(2004),
https://www.nsc.org/Portals/0/Documents/NSCDocuments_Advocacy/NSChistoryofCAO
D.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV64-ZNDW] (formatting modified from the original).
U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., 90TH CONG., 1968 ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORT 1
(COMM. PRINT 1968).
Voas, Kelley-Baker, Romano & Vishnuvajjala, supra note 15, at 3.
First Drunk Driving Arrest, HISTORY (Nov. 24, 2009), https://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/first-drunk-driving-arrest [https://perma.cc/93C9-BAFM].
16

17
18

19

See id.

Adam K. Raymond, A Brief History of Drunk Driving, THE FIX (Nov. 23, 2011),
https://www.thefix.com/content/brief-history-drunk-driving-dui-laws-thanksgiving7007
[https://perma.cc/K8YJ-6A87].
See Kelsey P. Black, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment: Examining the
Drinking and Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 463, 465
(2007).
Cheryl F. Hiemstra, Keeping DUI Implied Consent Laws Implied, 48 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 521, 523–24, n.7, 534 (2012); Voas, Kelley-Baker, Romano & Vishnuvajjala, supra note
15, at 3.
Tina Wescott Cafaro, Fixing the Fatal Flaws in OUI Implied Consent Laws, 34 J. LEGIS.
99, 102 (2008) (“An implied consent statute’s ‘central feature is that any person who drives
on the public highways is deemed to have consented to a chemical test to determine the
alcohol or drug content of the person’s blood.’”) (citing Hinnah v. Dir. of Revenue, 77
S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. 2002)).
See, e.g., Birchfield v. State, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); People v. Gaede, 20 N.E.3d 1266 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2014); Schutt v. MacDuff, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
20

21

22

23

24
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Evolution of Implied Consent Laws in Minnesota

In 1961, Minnesota enacted its first civil implied consent law. 25
Pursuant to this law, any person driving a vehicle in Minnesota impliedly
consents to a blood alcohol concentration test if the requesting officer has
probable cause to suspect impairment. 26 At that time, chemical testing
refusal was subject to automatic license revocation for a period of six
months. 27 The first case to recognize the application of the right to counsel
when a driver is requested to undergo blood alcohol concentration testing
was Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety. 28
The Minnesota Legislature amended the implied consent law in 1978,
following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Prideaux, which
afforded drivers a statutory right to consult with counsel before submitting
to chemical testing. 29 The amendments developed the Implied Consent
Advisory by obliging law enforcement to inform suspected drivers that they
have a limited right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to
submit to the chemical test, so long as it does not “unreasonably delay
administration of the test.” 30 Simultaneously, the Impaired Driving code was
amended to provide that “medical or chemical analysis” results determining
the “amount of alcohol or a controlled substance in the person’s blood,
breath, or urine” were only admissible as evidence in criminal DWI
prosecutions if the tests were “taken voluntarily or pursuant to § 169.123.” 31
Thus, chemical test results could only be used against a driver accused of
DWI if the driver consented to the test or if law enforcement complied with
State v. Capelle, 172 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. 1969) (“L. 1961, c. 454, established the so–
called ‘implied consent’ law, codified as § 169.123. . . . [the implied consent statute
establishes] the driver of a vehicle is given an option of consenting to a blood, urine, or breath
test, or having his driver’s license revoked for 6 months.”); OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra
note 12, at 3.
OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, supra note 12, at 3.
FORST LOWERY, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, DOT HS-806-549, MINNESOTA’S
DOUBLE BARRELLED IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 27 (Dec. 1983).
310 Minn. 405, 418, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393 (1976).
Id. at 391 (holding that drivers suspected of DWI have a statutory right to counsel before
deciding whether to submit to chemical testing pursuant to the implied consent law); Nyflot
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 1985) (“In 1978, the legislature
signified its agreement with Prideaux by expanding the implied consent advisory.”). The
previous Implied Consent Advisory only informed drivers that refusal to submit to chemical
testing would result in automatic license revocation and after submitting to the chemical test,
the driver could request additional tests administered by a person of his or her choosing.
MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1976) (repealed 2000).
1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 727, subdiv. 2(b)(3).
MINN. STAT. 169.121, subdiv.1(a) (repealed 2000).
25

26
27

28
29

30
31
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the procedures set out in the applicable implied consent statute, which
required drivers be informed of their right to consult with an attorney. 32
In 1984, legislative changes were made to the advisory to deny the right
to counsel prior to testing. 33 The modified advisory informed suspected
drivers that they are required to submit to the chemical testing pursuant to
Minnesota law and failure to do so would result in license revocation for
one year. 34 Because it no longer afforded drivers a limited right to counsel
prior to testing, drivers were informed they have a right to counsel only after
deciding whether to submit to the chemical test. 35 Thus, the legislative
changes to the implied consent law effectively eliminated the previously
recognized statutory right to counsel. Confirmed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s holding in Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Minnesota law
no longer afforded drivers suspected of DWI the statutory right to counsel
prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. 36
This changed once again in 1991 when the Minnesota Supreme Court
determined that the implied consent statute violates Article 1 section 6 of
the Minnesota Constitution because it denies a person of their state
constitutional limited right to counsel. 37 In response to the court’s decision,
the Minnesota Legislature tailored the Implied Consent Advisory to comply
with the Minnesota Constitution. In doing so, the new advisory required law
enforcement officers to inform drivers “[a]t the time testing is requested . .
. that the person has the right to consult with an attorney” before deciding

In 1984, the Legislature removed the limiting language from the Impaired Driving Code
and no longer relied on voluntary consent or the implied consent statute. Minnesota Statute
section 169A.45, subdivision 1 provides: “[u]pon the trial of any prosecution arising out of
the acts alleged to have been committed by any person arrested for violating section 169A.20
[(driving while impaired)] . . . the court may admit evidence of the presence or amount of
alcohol in the person’s blood, breath, or urine as shown by an analysis of those items.” MINN.
STAT. §169A.45, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 622, § 10, 1984 Minn. Laws 1336 (repealed 1993).
Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 622, § 12, 1984 Minn. Laws 1541, 1546–47 (repealed 1993). The
civil consequence of license revocation for refusal was increased from six months to one
year. Id.
32

33
34

35

Id.

Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 1985). The Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that the legislative changes made to the implied consent statute
demonstrate its intention to remove the limited right to counsel afforded to drivers. Id. at
515; see infra Section II(b)(ii)(3).
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).

36

37
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whether to submit to the test. 38 In 2001, the implied consent law was
recodified as Minnesota Statute sections 169A.50-169A.53. 39

2.

Minnesota’s Modern Implied Consent Law

Collectively, Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.50 to 169A.53 are
referred to as Minnesota’s “Implied Consent Law.” 40 The modern implied
consent Statute in Minnesota states:
Any person who drivers, operates, or is in physical control of a
motor vehicle within this state or on any boundary of water of this
state consents, subject to the provisions of sections 169A.50 to
169A.53 (implied consent law), and section 169A.20 (driving
while impaired), to a chemical test of that person’s blood, breath,
or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol,
a controlled substance or its metabolite, or an intoxicating
substance. 41
In order for a blood, breath, or urine test to be administered, the
implied consent statute, in relevant part, requires that it be at the direction
of a police officer who “has probable cause to believe the person was
driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of
section 169A.20 (driving while impaired).” 42 Before the administration of a
breath test, Minnesota law requires that drivers be informed that they are
required by law to take the test, that failure to submit to the test is a crime,
and that they have a limited right to consult with an attorney. 43 Although
warrantless breath tests are permissible, blood and urine tests can only be
conducted pursuant to a search warrant or a judicially recognized exception
to the search warrant requirement. 44
In response to Minnesota and U.S. Supreme Court rulings, the
legislature enacted Minnesota Statute section 171.177 (license revocation),
which requires blood and urine tests to be conducted in compliance with
specified procedures. 45 The chemical test advisory, pursuant to Minnesota
1993 Minn. Laws, ch. 347, § 10 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subdiv. 2(b) (Supp.
1993)) (repealed 2000).
2000 Minn. Laws, ch. 478, § 7.
MINN. STAT. § 169A.50 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1 (2019).

38

39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id. at subdiv. 2.
Id. at subdiv. 3. The breath test advisory informs a driver that they are required to take the

test pursuant to Minnesota law, refusal to submit to the test is a crime, and they have the
limited right to counsel. Id. at subdiv. 2.
Id. at subdiv. 3; State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Minn. 2019) (“But in 2017, the
Legislature amended the implied-consent statutes after several judicial decisions limited the
45
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Statute section 171.177, only informs drivers that “refusal to submit to a
blood or urine test is a crime.” 46 Despite the nature of implied consent, the
statute further provides that “[i]f a person refuses to permit a [warranted]
blood or urine test . . . then a test must not be given.” 47 Although law
enforcement may initially decide whether to administer a blood or urine
test, the suspected driver must be offered both a blood and urine test and
subsequently refuse both before the refusal amounts to an actionable
offense. 48

3.

Traffic Stops and Implied Consent Testing Procedures

The United States and the Minnesota Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. 49 Although a traffic
stop constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution and Article 1 section 10 of Minnesota’s Constitution,
traffic stops are considered investigative seizures and require lesser
justifications than custodial seizures. 50 In Minnesota, police may conduct a
limited investigative seizure without a warrant, so long as they have an
objective particularized articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the
traffic stop. 51 Although the standard for justification of traffic stops is
relatively lenient, the basis of the stop must be established on more than
“mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” 52 In determining whether the factual
ability of police to obtain warrantless blood and urine samples from suspected impaired
drivers.”).
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Id. at subdiv. 13; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1.
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 2 (2019).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The right of people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” See also MINN. CONST. art. I, §10.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MINN. CONST. art. I, §10. Contra Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968) (distinguishing an arrest from a limited and investigative search, and applying the
“reasonable articulable suspicion” standard to the latter); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (applying the “reasonable articulable suspicion” to motor vehicle stops).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (when
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists “consider the totality of the circumstances
and acknowledge that trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and
deductions that would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.”).
Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994); see also Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (recognizing that the factual basis required to justify an
investigative seizure is “obviously less demanding . . . than probable cause.”); State v. Cripps,
533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995); State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 101 (Minn. 1999) (“A
46
47
48
49

50

51

52
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basis sufficiently justifies a traffic stop, courts apply the totality of
circumstances test and may consider the “officer’s experience, general
knowledge, and observations; background information, including the nature
of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and
anything else that is relevant.” 53 Further, during a traffic stop each additional
intrusion “must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which
rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” 54 As a guide, the following
is an overview of the procedural requirements for impairment testing under
the implied consent law.
For a police officer to conduct a lawful traffic stop, he or she must
first have an objective particularized articulable suspicion of some type of
criminal activity. Even minor traffic violations justify investigative traffic
stops, such as speeding, changing lanes without using turn signals, and
swerving. 55 If an officer becomes aware of such conduct, it is likely he or she
has reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop. However, the Minnesota
Constitution requires that any additional intrusions not closely related to the
initial justification for the traffic stop be unlawful unless there is independent
probable cause or reasonableness to justify the subsequent intrusion. 56
The administration of field sobriety tests and preliminary breath tests
is an expansion of a traffic stop and must be supported by reasonable
suspicion of DWI. 57 Therefore, if blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”)
testing is not closely related to the additional stop, the officer must have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of DWI before he may lawfully
initiate impairment testing. 58 “An officer needs only one objective indication
of intoxication to constitute probable cause to believe that a person is under

hunch, without additional objectively articulable facts, cannot provide the basis for an
investigatory stop.”).
Applegate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987).
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004); see also State v. Creviston–Lerud,
No. A18-0843, 2019 WL 1233551, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019) (“The extension
of a traffic stop does not violate the Minnesota Constitution ‘so long as each incremental
intrusion during the stop is tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original
legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as
defined in Terry v. Ohio.’”) (citation omitted)).
State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (“Ordinarily, if an officer observes a
violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping
the vehicle.”); State v. Jones, 649 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding traffic
stop where police observed driver changing lanes without signaling).
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d, 262, 268–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) cert. denied (Minn. June 15,
2004).
53
54

55

56
57
58
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the influence,” which may include “an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and
watery eyes, slurred speech, and un uncooperative attitude.” 59
An officer whose intrusions are justified by reasonable suspicion and
probable cause may then request a preliminary breath test without obtaining
a warrant, but must first inform a driver that failure to submit to the breath
test is a crime and that he or she has a limited right to consult with counsel
before deciding whether to submit to the breath test. On the other hand, an
officer must obtain a search warrant for a driver’s blood and/or urine before
he or she can request a driver to submit fluid samples for chemical testing
purposes. Once the search warrant is obtained, the officer must read the
driver the fluid-test advisory to inform the driver that failure to submit to the
warranted-test is a crime. 60 At that moment, the driver is faced with a
decision—either comply with the search warrant and submit fluid samples,
or refuse to do so and suffer the criminal and civil consequences attached
to refusal. A driver who refuses to submit to the chemical test suffers the
legal ramifications of failure to submit and may not know that those
consequences can be more severe than the penalties attached to a DWI
conviction. Conversely, a driver may not know they have the legal option to
refuse to submit and halt administration of the chemical test. Thus, the
driver might submit to the test, fail, and have the results used as evidence
against him or her in subsequent criminal proceedings.
Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Rosenbush and the 2017 legislative amendments, drivers were able to make
well-informed decisions because they had the right to consult counsel before
deciding whether to submit. After the Court’s decision, drivers no longer
have the right to counsel until after deciding, which is arguably too late
because the driver’s decision is binding at that point. The right to counsel is
meant to attach at the point an accused needs the assistance of counsel. 61

B. The Right to Counsel
1.

United States Constitutional Right

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that:
“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 62 The central purpose of the
59

Id.

Language has been added and eliminated by the legislature throughout the years. See infra
Part II.
See infra Part 2(b)(ii).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment
originated from colonial statutes and constitutional provisions deliberately rejecting the
60

61
62
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Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel was to assure that the accused, when
“confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the . . .
prosecutor,” would be given assistance. 63 Indispensable to the fair
administration of our adversarial system, the right to counsel is at the core
of constitutional criminal procedure. 64 As Justice Sutherland explained:
The right to be heard would be in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. 65
There are two central reasons for the existence of a right to counsel.
First, the layman requires protection from the complexities of the legal
system. 66 A defendant may be uninformed concerning the legal rights
granted to him. Thus, he requires the “guidance of one who is trained in the
law to guard against the involuntary waiver of such rights.” 67 Additionally,
even a defendant who understands his legal rights may “become so
hopelessly confused in following the different paths of the law that he may
unintentionally lose the advantages that our accusatorial system of law
affords him.” 68 It is important to recognize that the foundation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is grounded in a lawyer’s professional role as
English common-law rule, which “severely limited the right of a person accused of a felony
to consult with counsel at trial.” See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973) (citing
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932)).
Ash, 413 U.S. at 309.
Akhil R. Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 641 (1996) (“The
Sixth Amendment is the heartland of constitutional criminal procedure.”); Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[T]he right to counsel safeguards the other rights
deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal proceeding.”); Ash, 413 U.S. at 307–
8 (The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted “to assure that the ‘guiding hand of counsel’
is available to those in need of its assistance.”) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344–345 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972)).
Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 292 (1980) (“[T]he concerns underlying the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel are to provide aid to the layman in arguing the law and in coping
with intricate legal procedures . . . .”); Felix Rackow, The Right to Counsel –– Time for
Recognition Under the Due Process Clause, 10 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 216, 226 (1959)
(“[T]he layman needs protection from the complexities of the legal system under which he
lives.”).
Rackow, supra note 66, at 226.
63
64

65
66

67
68

Id.
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a legal expert and strategist. 69 Second, the accused layman needs protection
from fervent prosecutors. 70 The right to counsel acts as “a shield by which
an accused defendant is protected from a vengeful public or overzealous
police, prosecutors, or judges.” 71 Thus, the core purpose of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial is ensure fairness in the adversarial system by
providing assistance to the accused confronted with the intricacies of law
and minimizing the public prosecutor’s substantial advantages.
Although originally enforceable only in federal courts, the Supreme
Court recognized the fundamental significance of the right to counsel in
1963 and made it binding on the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 At first, the Court broadly defined “critical
stage” as the point at which the accused requires counsel’s presence and
guidance in order to secure later trial rights. 73 The Court later clarified the
application of the right to counsel and held that it applies once a “critical
stage” 74 in the criminal process is reached through the “initiation of judicial

Henry, 447 U.S. at 293 (“[T]he theoretical foundation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is based on the traditional role of an attorney as a legal expert and strategist.”).
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945) (“A layman is usually no match for the skilled
prosecutor whom he confronts in the court room. He needs the aid of counsel lest he be the
victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law’s complexity, or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment.”); F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment, 61 YALE L.J. 286 (1951) (“[T]he accused
in the colonies faced a government official whose specific function it was to prosecute, and
who was incomparably more familiar than the accused with the problems of procedure, the
idiosyncrasies of juries, and, last, but not lease, the personnel of the court.”).
Damon J. Keith, Civil Liberties and Criminal Law: Balancing the Rights of the Accused
with
Rights
of
Society,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
10,
1977),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1977/11/10/ civil-liberties-and-criminal-lawbalancing-the-rights-of-the-accused-with-rights-of-society/9927e31d-7d8a-4790-af1d4e08527875d7/ [https://perma.cc/8FRR-W5S5]; Neil W. Schilke, Right to Counsel – An
Unrecognized Right, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 318, 338–39 (1960) (“Without making any
claim to generalization, it may be stated as common knowledge that the prosecuting
technique in the United States is purported so as to regard a conviction as a personal victory
calculated to enhance the prestige of the prosecutor. . . . This often serves to induce the
prosecutor, who will later campaign on his conviction record, to unquestioningly assume guilt
and unrelentingly prosecute the person accused. . . . Prosecutors have justified many illegal
practices by the “deluded dogma that the end will sanctify the means.”).
See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (describing the right to
counsel as fundamental and essential).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975) (describing a critical stage as any stage at which
“potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres” including “pretrial procedures
that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without
counsel.”); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1967).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
382–83 (1968)).
69

70

71

72

73

74
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criminal proceedings.” 75 Thus, under the United States Constitution, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be afforded to the accused once
formal adversarial judicial proceedings commence. 76 However, as Justice
Yetka said, “[a] state is free to offer its citizens greater protection in its
constitution than is offered by the federal law.” 77

2.

Minnesota’s State Constitutional Right to Counsel

In 1887, the Minnesota legislature first recognized the importance of
the right to counsel when it enacted a statute guaranteeing that right for
persons “restrained of liberty.” 78 The legislative intent and public policy
behind this statute reflects Minnesota’s longstanding objective to afford
persons “an immediate right to communicate with counsel concerning the
impending proceedings against him.” 79 Consistent with the intent and form
of its predecessor, the statute remains in effect today. 80
Not only is the right to counsel protected by the statute, it is also
guaranteed by both the state and federal constitution. The Minnesota
Constitution provides that: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.” 81 Despite
the compatible language employed in both the Minnesota Constitution and
the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the federal provisions are not determinative regarding the state’s
interpretation of its own state’s provisions. 82 Thus, an individual may be
afforded greater and more expansive protections under its state law than is
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (judicial criminal proceedings may include “formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”).
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187–89 (1984).
Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting).
1887 Minn. Laws ch. 187, 1. (“All public officers . . . having in custody any person . . .
restrained of his liberty for any alleged cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent
danger of escape, admit any practicing attorney at law who may have been retained by or in
behalf of such person so restrained of his liberty, or whom such person may desire to see or
consult, to see such person and consult with him alone and in private, at the jail or other
place of custody.”)
Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 393 (Minn. 1976).
MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (2019).
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 773 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (“[W]e are not
obliged to adopt the United States Supreme Court’s construction of a federal constitutional
provision in interpreting our own constitution even if the language of a state constitutional
privilege is identical.”) (citation omitted); Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The
Minnesota Bill of Rights: “Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist,” 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 63
(1984) (“Identical meaning should not be implied merely because there is identical
language.”).
75

76
77
78

79
80
81
82
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offered by the federal law. 83 As Chief Judge John R. Tunheim of the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota once stated:
The rebirth of state constitutional law has given states a
remarkable opportunity to take a step back and examine how
broadly individual rights should be protected. . . . [T]he
reemergence of state constitutions presents the State of
Minnesota with opportunities to interpret its constitution in a
manner that truly reflects the unique values and interests of
Minnesotans. Here lies the greatest value of a state constitution—
its ability to react to unique local concerns and conditions. 84
Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until
the criminal justice proceedings against an individual have reached a critical
stage in federal court, state courts are free to determine the appropriate
point at which criminal proceedings reach a critical stage in the respective
state’s constitution. 85 In Friedman, the Court adopted the United States
Supreme Court’s broad definition of “critical stage,” meaning “those pretrial
procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is
required to proceed without counsel.” 86 Despite the consistent terminology,
the court is not bound to reach the same conclusions as its federal
counterpart in determining whether a certain event constitutes a critical
stage. 87 In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has found that the “critical
stage” in a criminal proceeding attaches earlier under Minnesota’s
Constitution than it does under federal law. However, the court has
struggled with determining whether the limited right to counsel applies at
the time a test is being administered in DWI cases, which is revealed
through an examination of four Minnesota Supreme Court cases that
exemplify the development of qualifying this moment as a “critical stage”
relative to Minnesota’s DWI proceedings. 88 The following cases analyze the
Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting)
(“A state is free to offer its citizens greater protection in its constitution than is offered by the
federal law.”).
Hon. John R. Tunheim, Criminal Justice: Expanded Protections Under the Minnesota
Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 465, 466 (1994).
Matsakis & Spector, Toward an Activist Role for State Bill of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.–C.L.L
REV. 271, 318–19 (1973).
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991); see also Gerstein
v. Pugh, 429 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).
Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833 n.4 (“We approved use of the terms . . . although they arose
from federal doctrine, as embodying concepts that provided guidance as we examined our
state constitution. We likewise make use of ‘critical stage’ analysis as we now interpret our
Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.”).
State v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1971) (holding there is no federal constitutional
right to counsel before deciding whether to submit); Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
83

84

85

86

87

88
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“critical stage” inquiry under Minnesota’s statutory right to counsel, the
United States Constitutional right to counsel, and Minnesota’s
Constitutional limited right to counsel.
First, in 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a
critical stage in a criminal proceeding is reached once a driver suspected of
DWI is requested to submit to chemical testing pursuant to Minnesota’s
implied consent statute. 89 In State v. Palmer, the defendant challenged his
license revocation on the grounds that he was denied his constitutional right
to consult with an attorney at the time the chemical tests were requested. 90
The court rejected the defendant’s argument and upheld the revocation of
his license. 91 In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on the civil nature
of license revocation and found “[t]he defendant, therefore, is not clothed
with those substantive constitutional rights associated with criminal
matters.” 92
In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court first afforded a driver
suspected of DWI with the protections of the statutory right to counsel
before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing is requested of a
driver suspected of DWI. 93 In Prideaux v. Department of Public Safety, the
court considered the public policy behind the statutory right to counsel –
“to secure for the person in custody an immediate right to communicate
with counsel concerning the impending proceedings against him.” 94 The
247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976) (reaffirming no federal constitutional right to counsel, but
recognizing that there is a state statutory right to counsel before deciding whether to submit
to chemical testing); Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 512 (considering the 1984 legislative changes to
the implied consent law, the court held that there is neither a federal constitutional right nor
state statutory right to counsel); Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 828 (recognizing a state
constitutional right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing). In
order to fully understand the limited right to counsel under Minnesota’s Constitution, these
four cases should be read as a “quartet.” Transcript of Oral Argument, State v. Rosenbush,
931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019) (No. A18-0377).
Palmer, 191 N.W.2d at 188.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 191 (“The weight of authority is to the effect that because an administrative
proceeding for the suspension of a driver’s license is a civil proceeding, and not a criminal
prosecution, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to consult with an attorney
before deciding whether to accede to an officer’s request to submit to a blood test.”).
Id. at 190 (“‘[R]evocation of a [driver’s] license is not a punishment but is rather an exercise
of the police power for the protection of the public.’ . . . ‘A license revocation proceeding is
civil in nature, notwithstanding the vague language . . . that the judicial hearing ‘shall proceed
as in a criminal matter.’” (citations omitted)).
Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976) (effectively, but not
expressly overturning State v. Palmer which did not recognize a right to counsel before
submitting to a chemical test).
Id. at 393.
89
90
91

92

93

94
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court ultimately concluded that the “importance of a driver’s license and the
binding decisions which must be made by the driver asked to submit to
chemical testing make the chemical-testing process a ‘proceeding’ within the
meaning of § 481.10 before which consultation with counsel is to be
accorded.” 95 Additionally, the court found that the person must be
informed of this statutory right. 96
Although the court refrained from deciding the constitutional issues
raised, it acknowledged the meaningful decision that a suspected drunk
driver must make when confronted with the choice of submitting to
chemical testing, reasoning that “the driver who is requested to submit to
chemical testing might not know that he can reasonably refuse the test in
certain circumstances where the officer did not . . . properly inform the
driver of his rights, or confused the driver as to his rights.” 97 Based on the
court’s analysis of hypothetical scenarios in which a suspected driver might
plausibly consider declining chemical testing, it determined that the decision
is critical and binding. 98 The court equated the critical and binding character
of the decision to submit to chemical testing with the decision to make a
verbal statement. 99
Furthermore, the court articulated its doubts concerning the validity of
prior holding—that chemical testing is not a critical stage in a criminal
proceeding because of the civil nature of the proceeding. 100 The Prideaux
court reasoned that the “civil” label attached to driver’s license revocation
proceedings is not dispositive where important constitutional rights are
involved, emphasizing three reasons. 101 First, license revocation following the
failure to submit to chemical testing is “necessarily and inextricably
intertwined with an undeniably criminal proceeding – namely, prosecution
for driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.” 102 The
obvious and intended purpose of the implied consent law is to coerce
Id. (adding that if the “implied–consent statute forbids a limited right to counsel before
chemical testing, that statute, which is later and more specific in its scope, would control.”).
Id. at 394 (recognizing that law enforcement must assist in the vindication of the right to
counsel).
Id. at 390.
Id. (considering situations in which a suspected driver might genuinely prefer refusal of the
test due to the possibility of decreased criminal convictions and accept the consequences
resulting from refusal, specifically the six month license revocation).
Id. (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
Id. at 388; see also, e.g., State v. Palmer, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971) (holding a driver does
not have a constitutional right to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to
a chemical test).
Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 388.
95

96

97
98

99

100

101
102

Id.

2020]

CASE NOTE: STATE V. ROSENBUSH

383

drivers suspected of DWI into providing evidence that can be used against
him in subsequent criminal proceedings. 103 Second, the similarity of the
impact of license revocation and traditional criminal sanctions cannot be
overlooked. 104 Thus, “we cannot allow a ‘civil’ label to obscure the quasicriminal consequences of revocation to the ordinary citizen.” 105 Lastly, the
court noted the significance of the decision of whether to take or refuse
chemical testing, which “is arguably a ‘critical stage’” in DWI proceedings. 106
Although Prideaux was limited to statutory rights, its impact on and
application to constitutional right to counsel cases cannot go unnoticed. 107
In Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the Minnesota Supreme
Court confronted challenges to the 1984 legislative amendments made to
the Implied Consent Advisory based on the United States Constitution and
a Minnesota Statute § 481.10 108 After being arrested for DWI, law
enforcement read Nyflot the implied consent advisory, which in relevant
part, informed her that “‘after submitting to testing,’ she had the right to
consult with an attorney.” 109 Despite her persistent attempts to contact an
attorney before deciding, Nyflot eventually refused to submit to the
chemical testing. 110 She was then permitted to contact an attorney, who
advised her to accede to the officer’s request. 111 Despite her eagerness to
comply after obtaining advice from her attorney, the officer told her she was
no longer allowed to submit to the test. 112
Nyflot argued that the legislative changes did not eliminate the
statutory right to counsel recognized in Prideaux. 113 Additionally, if they did,
such legislation violates the Sixth Amendment Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 114 Disagreeing
103

Id.

Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (citing Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d
at 388).
Prideaux, 247 N.W.2d at 389.
104

105
106

Id.

1 MINNESOTA MISDEMEANORS § 17.04 [12][a]. In Commissioner of Public Safety v.
Campbell, 494 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1992), the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested the case
law established from Prideaux should be followed and relied upon in applying and
interpreting Friedman. Id.
See generally Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety., 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985).
Id. at 513–14.
Id. at 514.
107

108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Id.; see generally Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1976)

(finding MINN. STAT. § 481.10 provided a statutory right to counsel when a driver is
confronted with a request to submit to a chemical test).
Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 514.
114
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with Nyflot and the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that the statutory right to counsel does not attach before a
suspect decides whether to submit to chemical testing. 115 The court reasoned
that “[b]ecause the legislature originally signified its adherence to the
Prideaux ruling by amending the advisory . . . it makes sense that the
legislature intended to abandon the Prideaux right to counsel by later
amending the advisory to remove this right.” 116 Thus, the court held that
Minnesota no longer provides a statutory right to counsel when faced with
the decision to submit to chemical testing. 117
The court further held that there is no federal constitutional right to
counsel when confronted with this decision. 118 Although the court
acknowledged that its decision in Prideaux indicated that such a decision
sufficed as a “critical stage,” subsequent United States Supreme Court cases
have since narrowed the definition of “critical stage.” 119 Pursuant to federal
law, the right to counsel does not attach until judicial proceedings are
formally commenced. 120 Therefore, the court held that there is neither a
state statutory right nor a federal constitutional right to counsel in this
situation. 121
In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the Minnesota
Supreme Court was asked to determine when Minnesota’s State
Constitutional right to counsel is triggered in a DWI proceeding. 122 The
court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s definition of what
constitutes a “critical stage” in a criminal proceeding, which includes “those
pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused
is required to proceed without counsel.” 123
115
116

Id. at 517.
Id. at 515. This dissent challenged the majority’s reasoning, recognizing that “[t]his statute

has never been amended. As counsel for the state admitted, the 1984 legislature was
presented several proposals to amend section 481.10 to exclude specifically the implied
consent situation but rejected them all. Today, by limiting the statute’s effect, this court has
effectively amended the statute without legislative authorization.” Id. at 519–20 (Yetka, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 515.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 515, 517; accord Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (the plurality held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel under the Federal Constitution does not attach until
judicial proceedings are formally commenced). Subsequent cases have reinforced the
plurality’s decision. See Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 516; United States v. Gourvia, 467 U.S. 180
(1984); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 517.
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 1991).
Id. at 833 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975)).
117
118
119

120
121
122
123
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Friedman was arrested after failing a preliminary breath test and was
subsequently arrested for DWI. 124 At the police station, Friedman inquired
about her rights and ability to contact an attorney. 125 The officer did not allow
her to speak with counsel. 126 The officer read the Implied Consent Advisory,
which informed her that her “driver’s license would be revoked for one year
if she refused chemical testing for blood alcohol, that the refusal or results
of the test would be used against her at trial, and that she had a right to
consult an attorney after testing.” 127 Although the officer read the advisory
three times, Friedman did not understand the advisory and was still
confused about her rights. 128 The officer deemed Friedman’s confused
response a refusal, which led to a one-year license revocation pursuant to
the statute applicable at the time. 129
Application of the newly adopted definition in the court’s
interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution led the court to hold that any
person suspected of DWI and asked to submit to chemical testing is at a
“critical stage” in DWI proceedings. 130 The court relied on its reasoning in
Prideaux concerning the decision’s significance, stating that “[a] driver must
make a critical and binding decision regarding chemical testing, a decision
that will affect him or her in subsequent proceedings.” 131 The implied
consent statute placed individuals suspected of DWI in a unique situation
that required “aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting
their adversary.” 132 Specifically, the court emphasized a suspected driver’s
need for an “objective advisor to explain the different legal consequences.” 133
Thus, Friedman recognized that Minnesota’s Constitution afforded drivers
suspected of DWI a limited right to consult with counsel before deciding
whether to submit to chemical testing.
The Court clarified the applicability of the limited right to counsel
recognized in Friedman and restricted its application only to implied
consent cases because of the unique decision and consequences that come
with the reading of the advisory. 134 In State v. Hunn, without reading the
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 829.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subdiv. 4 (1990).
Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. (“An attorney, not a police officer, is the appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney

functions as an objective advisor who could explain the alternative choices.”).
State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 2018).
134

386

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

Implied Consent Advisory, an officer requested that an individual suspected
of driving under the influence of a controlled substance submit to a urine
test. 135 The individual agreed and the test showed amphetamine and
methamphetamine in his urine. 136 He was formally charged and
subsequently moved to suppress the urine test results because the officer
failed to vindicate his right to counsel prior to testing by not informing him
of his rights or the consequences of his decision. 137 Ultimately, the court
concluded that the constitutional limited right to counsel is triggered only
upon a reading of the Implied Consent Advisory. 138 Where the implied
consent law is not invoked, the court found that the constitutional right to
counsel does not attach until commencement of formal judicial
proceedings. 139
III. THE ROSENBUSH DECISION

A. Facts and Procedure
On July 23, 2017, a Dakota County Sheriff’s Deputy was dispatched
to investigate a car that allegedly left the scene of an accident. 140 The deputy
noticed front-end damage on Rosenbush’s vehicle and stopped her based
on his suspicion that she was involved in the car accident. 141 Specifically, the
deputy believed that Rosenbush drove into a ditch, hit a sign, and left the
scene of an accident. 142 The deputy conducted an investigative detention to
further scrutinize his suspicion. Throughout the course of the deputy’s
questioning, he began to suspect that Rosenbush had consumed alcohol. 143
Rosenbush made two admissions during the conversation. First, she
admitted her involvement in the car accident. 144 Second, she admitted to
consuming “two to three beers” earlier in the day. 145 The deputy then
requested Rosenbush perform a field sobriety test. Although she initially
135
136
137
138

Id. at 817.
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819–20.

State v. Nielsen, 530 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Rosenbush, No. A18–0377, 2018 WL 3340530, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9,
2018).
Id. at *1–2.
State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Minn. 2019).
Id. In addition to an alcohol-like odor coming from Rosenbush, she was crying and slow
to respond to questions. Id.
Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *2 (Rosenbush stated she had “misjudged a turn, gone
off the road, hit a sign, and driven away.”).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 93.

139
140

141
142
143

144

145
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refused, eventually she cooperated and agreed to take the breath test. 146 The
preliminary breath test results revealed that her alcohol concentration was
over the legal limit. 147 At some point in the conversation, the deputy inquired
about the physical marks on Rosenbush’s wrists. 148 She informed him of her
recent suicide attempt and further stated that her suicidal urges were
resurfacing. 149
The deputy arrested Rosenbush for driving while intoxicated (DWI),
but rather than transporting her to the police station, he arranged for an
ambulance to bring her to the hospital to be placed on a mental health hold
pursuant to the county crisis unit’s recommendations. 150 While Rosenbush
was en route to the hospital, the deputy’s supervisor obtained a search
warrant for a blood sample from Rosenbush, which was faxed to the
hospital. 151 Once the deputy arrived at the hospital, he served Rosenbush
with the search warrant and read her the Implied Consent Advisory for
blood and urine tests in compliance with Minnesota Statute section 171.177,
subdivision 1. 152 The test advisory informed Rosenbush that “refusal to
submit to a blood or urine test is a crime,” but did not convey to Rosenbush
that she had a right to consult counsel before making her decision. 153 Based
on this information, Rosenbush allowed a nurse to draw her blood for
purposes of chemical testing. 154 The test results revealed that her blood
alcohol concentration was over the legal limit of .08. 155
Rosenbush was charged with fourth-degree DWI. 156 Rosenbush
moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the deputy failed
to vindicate her limited constitutional right to counsel established in
Friedman prior to submitting to the chemical test. 157 The district court
granted Rosenbush’s motion to suppress the results of the blood tests,
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Id.
Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *2.
Id.
Id. She was arrested pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 (2018).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 1(1), 169A.27 (2018). In addition to the DWI

charges, Rosenbush was charged with leaving the scene of an accident (MINN. STAT. §
169.09, subdiv. 2 (2018)) and her driver’s license was revoked under MINN. STAT. § 171.177,
subdiv. 5 (2018). Neither issue was addressed on appeal. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94 n.1.
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94; Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828
(Minn. 1991) (finding that the Minnesota Constitution afforded drivers suspected of DWI a
limited right to counsel prior to deciding whether to comply with a chemical testing request).
157
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finding that her constitutional rights were violated because she was not
afforded the right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit
to the blood test. 158 The State appealed the district court’s pretrial
suppression order. 159

B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Decision
On appeal, the State argued that the district court relied on
inapplicable law based on the 2017 changes to the DWI laws and urged the
court to hold that “the limited right to counsel recognized in Friedman is
only implicated when chemical testing is sought under the implied consent
law.” 160 The state focused on the fact that law enforcement obtained a search
warrant for Rosenbush’s blood and reasoned that “a search warrant ensures
that a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights are protected because it is only
issued after a probable-cause determination by a judge or magistrate. And
because a warrant ‘commands’ a DWI arrestee to submit to testing,
eliminating any choice to do otherwise, the testing is merely investigative.” 161
In addition to the Fourth Amendment protections, the State argued that
“the existence of the warrant shields the driver from having to ‘meet[] his
adversary’ in the form of a police officer who acts ‘with full legal power of
the state.’” 162 Thus, the State urged the court to refuse to extend the limited
right to counsel to warranted chemical tests. 163
Conversely, Rosenbush challenged the State’s reasoning, contending
that the limited right to counsel is triggered whenever a driver is presented
with a choice of submitting to a chemical test that carries immediate
consequences. 164 According to Rosenbush, the only time the right to counsel
does not attach is “when drivers do not have the choice to refuse testing.” 165
158
159

Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 94.
Id.

State v. Rosenbush, No. A18–0377, 2018 WL 3340530, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9,
2018); see also Respondent’s Brief at 9, State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019)
(No. A18-0377) (“The district court’s conclusion in this case is erroneous because the limited
right to counsel under Friedman is inapplicable here . . . because law enforcement obtained
a valid search warrant to collect the blood sample.”).
Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *7–8 (citing MINN. STAT. § 626.05 (2016)); State v.
Condon, 497 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“[I]f a driver has no choice . . . there
is no need, and hence no right, to contact counsel.”); see also Respondent’s Brief, supra note
160, at 10 (“[T]he existence of a warrant alters the testing process in such a way that a driver
has no legal right that must be either exercised or forfeited.” (citing State v. Maddox, 825
N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013))).
Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530, at *8 (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833–34).
Id. at *7.
160

161

162
163
164
165

Id.
Id. at *3.
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Because the existing statute affords drivers subjected to a warranted search
of blood or urine a choice that carries immediate consequences, drivers
suspected of DWI may nevertheless face a consequential choice concerning
submission to chemical testing, despite the presence of a search warrant. 166
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized the merit of both
arguments, but ultimately found in favor of the State and reversed the district
court’s suppression of the chemical test results. 167 The court’s analysis
focused on the inadequacy of the “unique choice” presented to
Rosenbush. 168 The court found that Rosenbush was not presented with a
unique decision because the deputy did not give Rosenbush a choice. 169 He
did not ask for Rosenbush’s consent to the test, nor inform her that her
refusal would prohibit the State from obtaining her blood for the chemical
test. 170 In short, the Court of Appeals concluded that in order for a driver
suspected of DWI to have a limited constitutional right to counsel, the
officer must give the suspect “a choice between alternatives that carr[y]
different, significant, legal ramifications.” 171 Otherwise, a warranted search
of a driver’s blood does not constitute a “critical stage” of a DWI proceeding
to trigger the limited constitutional right to counsel. 172 The Minnesota
Supreme Court granted Rosenbush’s petition for review. 173

C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue to be reviewed as
follows:
The issue before us is whether a driver arrested on suspicion of
DWI, read an implied-consent advisory, and presented with a
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at *9.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that “although the officer knew Rosenbush had

a choice about whether to submit to a test, because he chose to withhold that information
from Rosenbush, the officer extinguished her constitutional right to consult with an attorney.
And because the officer deliberately withheld that critical information, the court said, ‘We
are persuaded that the information Rosenbush received makes this case more like Hunn
than Friedman.’” Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 17–18, State v. Rosenbush, 931
N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 2019) (No. A18-0377). But the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this
logic because although Minnesota Statute section 169A.52, subdivision 1 and section
171.177, subdivision 13 prohibit law enforcement from executing the search warrant if the
driver refuses, the choice to refuse to comply with the warrant still exists regardless of the
information known to the driver. Rosenbush, 2018 WL 3340530 at *5–6 n.8.
Id. at *4.
State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 2019).
172
173
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search warrant authorizing a search of her blood has the right “to
a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding
whether to submit to chemical testing” under Article I, Section 6
of the Minnesota Constitution. 174
The majority’s analysis first examined recent changes made to
Minnesota’s implied consent laws. 175 Specifically, the court noted the
significance of two differences between the current statutory provision and
its predecessor: the new warrant requirement for blood and urine tests and
the new fluid-test advisory. Minnesota Statute section 169A.51, subdivision
3 now requires that blood and urine tests “be conducted only pursuant to a
search warrant . . . or a judicially recognized exception to the search warrant
requirement” and in accordance with the procedures specified in Minnesota
Statute section 171.177. 176 Although the breath test advisory continues to
require that law enforcement inform drivers of the limited right to counsel,
the new fluid-test advisory eliminates that prerequisite. 177 The new fluid-test
advisory, pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 171. 177, subdivision 1,
requires police to inform drivers “that refusal to submit to a blood or urine
test is a crime.” 178
In its analysis concerning the new warrant requirement, the majority
noted that Rosenbush, like every person subjected to a search warrant, was
presented with a choice: “comply with the warrant or be subject to criminal
penalties.” 179 The court further went on to state that it has “never held that
the Minnesota Constitution provides the subject of a search warrant with the
right to consult counsel before a warrant can be executed.” 180 Thus, because
Rosenbush was faced with a choice that paralleled the choice any other
individual subjected to a search warrant, the choice was “not enough to
justify an extension of Friedman to warranted searches.” 181 In essence, the
court determined that the presence of a search warrant removed the features
that made the decision in Friedman “unique.” 182 The majority explained:
174
175
176
177

Id. (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991)).
Id. at 95–97.
Id. at 97; see also MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 3(a) (2019).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2019)

(requiring that at the time a breath test is requested, an officer must inform the person: “(1)
that Minnesota law requires the person to take a test . . . ; (2) that refusal to submit to a breath
test is a crime; and (3) that the person has the right to consult with an attorney, but that this
right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administration of the test.”).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97.
178
179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
Id. at 97–98.
Id.
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The existence of a search warrant eliminates many of the
concerns that led us to expand the right to counsel in Friedman.
The Fourth Amendment protects “personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the state,” by generally requiring
that police obtain a search warrant before searching a person or
place. And the presence of a search warrant ensures that drivers
are not faced with the unchecked “legal power of the state,”
because “a neutral and detached magistrate” has been interposed.
Therefore, when a suspected impaired driver is presented with a
search warrant for a blood or urine test, the driver is not “meeting
his adversary” in the same manner as the driver in Friedman
because a neutral judicial officer has determined that the police
may lawfully obtain a sample of the of the driver’s blood. 183
The majority’s final point centered around the meaningfulness of the
driver’s choice. Under the new law, test refusal is a crime in its own right
and carries a penalty similar to a DWI conviction. 184 According to the
majority, “[t]he similarity of these penalties under the current law further
cuts against the utility of counsel in this situation where little explanation of
the ‘alternative choices’ and ‘legal ramifications’ is necessary.” 185
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that “conducting a
search pursuant to a lawful warrant adequately safeguards the ‘human rights
[and] human dignity’ about which we were concerned in Friedman and
supplies meaningful ‘procedural protection for the rights of the criminally
accused.’” 186 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals’ reversal of the district court’s pretrial suppression of the blood
alcohol concentration results and held that the limited constitutional right
to counsel recognized in Friedman does not apply where a suspected driver
is faced with a warranted blood test. 187

D. The Dissent
The dissent emphasized the court’s reasoning in Hunn, which
recognized that the limited right to counsel is triggered based on the “unique

183
184

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 99; see MINN. STAT. § 169A.26 (2018) (stating that refusal to submit to a chemical

test constitutes a gross misdemeanor if no aggravating factors are present); MINN. STAT. §
169A.27 (2018) (stipulating that DWI constitutes a misdemeanor if no aggravating factors
are present).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 99 (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d
828, 833 (Minn. 1991)).
185

186
187

Id.
Id.
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decision” and “consequences that came with the reading of the [implied
consent] advisory.” 188
First, the dissent parallels Rosenbush’s situation to that in Friedman,
where the court found a unique decision existed. Like Friedman,
Rosenbush was read the applicable implied consent advisory and presented
with two options: “submit to a chemical test and give the police potentially
incriminating evidence, or refuse and have her license automatically
revoked and potentially convicted of DWI.” 189 The dissent emphasized the
variation of the consequences involved. In Friedman, the driver’s
consequences consisted of license revocation and potential DWI
conviction. A driver in Rosenbush’s position could face not only license
revocation and potential DWI conviction but, additionally, independent
criminal charges for test refusal. 190 Therefore, the dissent argues that the
unique decision Rosenbush encountered affords her the same right to
counsel as the driver in Friedman. 191
The dissent explicitly disagreed with the majority’s reasoning that the
presence of a search warrant eradicates the “unique decision” recognized in
Friedman because of the customary scenario. The majority reasoned that
the decision regarding one’s compliance with a search warrant is not a
“unique decision” because every individual subjected to a search warrant
must make the same decision—comply with the warrant or bear the
punishment for refusal. 192 While the dissent acknowledged the validity of the
consequences for refusal to comply with a search warrant, it argued that the
implied consent law is sui generis 193 because it expressly prohibits law
enforcement from executing a search warrant and conducting a chemical
test after a driver’s refusal, albeit with certain exceptions. 194 In any other
context, police may be authorized to use reasonable force in order to
execute the search warrant when faced with refusal to comply. 195 Because
the implied consent law forbids law enforcement from executing the search
Id. at 100 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn.
2018)).
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.21, subdiv. 1, 2(2), 171.177, subdiv. 4 (2018)).
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.26 (2018)) (making a first-time test refusal a gross
misdemeanor).
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 101.
Sui Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ( “Of its own kind or class; unique
or peculiar.”).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101.
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2018)) (“If a person refuses to permit a
blood or urine test as required by a search warrant . . . then a test must not be given.”); see
also MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1 (2018) (including the same prohibition for breath
tests).
188

189
190

191
192
193

194
195
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warrant, it is distinguishable from search warrants in any other context. 196
Thus, the dissent concluded that the presence of a search warrant does not
change the fact that the driver is faced with a unique decision, and that
decision should trigger the limited right to counsel announced in
Friedman. 197
The dissent then focused on the fundamental differences
encompassed by the Fourth and Sixth Amendment and the country’s
precedent. It articulated that search warrants are meant to protect the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 198
Ultimately, search warrants protect individual privacy. 199 The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, in contrast, is meant to protect the average
individual lacking the legal skill and knowledge to adequately defend
himself. 200 The dissent concluded, “[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment and
the right to counsel protect fundamentally different interests, the presence
of one does not negate the utility of the other.” 201
Lastly, the dissent rejected the majority’s analysis that the presence of
a search warrant ameliorates the concerns presented in Friedman. 202 It
acknowledged that a search warrant will aid a driver in “meeting his
adversary,” but emphasized lingering concerns that a search warrant cannot
resolve. 203 The possibility that drivers may be confused about the “legal
ramifications” of their decisions under the implied consent advisory urged
the court to provide a limited right to counsel. 204 A search warrant is
obviously unable to provide “aid in coping with legal problems” to drivers,
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“Thus—in a white–collar criminal
investigation, for instance—an individual’s ‘choice’ in deciding whether to comply with a
warrant is not the same as a driver’s choice in deciding whether to submit to chemical testing
under the implied-consent law.”).
196

197
198
199

Id.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)) (regarding “personal privacy

and dignity”); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
757 (1985).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“The right to counsel, on the
other hand, ‘protect[s] the lay person who “lacks both the skill and knowledge” to defend
him- or herself.’” (citing Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn.
1991))).
Id.; Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2006) (“[O]ur view, under the Minnesota
Constitution, [is] that a defendant’s access to the other protections afforded in criminal
proceedings cannot be meaningful without the assistance of counsel.”).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 102 (Justice Hudson noted that this concern was not the driving force behind the
recognition of a limited right to counsel in Friedman).
200

201

202
203

204

Id.
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and thus the limited right to counsel is still necessary. 205 Additionally, a driver
asked to submit to chemical testing is confronted with a “critical and
binding” decision that will affect the driver in subsequent DWI
proceedings. 206 A search warrant does not make the decision any less critical
nor binding because it cannot stop the driver’s decision from “impair[ing]
defense on the merits” if they submit to the testing. 207
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Problems with Minnesota Statute Section 171.177
The Legislature’s enactment of Minnesota Statute section 171.177 is
a logical response to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Birchfield 208 and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holdings in Thompson 209
and Trahan. 210 Collectively, those cases held that for test refusal to be
actionable as a criminal offense, it must be supported by a valid search
warrant. Thus, subdivision 1 requires that chemical testing of blood and
urine be conducted pursuant to a search warrant. 211 Rather than maintaining
consistency in the procedural execution of search warrants, the statute
included various provisions that limit law enforcement’s ability to lawfully
execute the search warrant and obtain the object of the search under this
statute. These provisions clearly contradict the fundamental purpose of a
search warrant and modify the procedural execution of search warrants
under the implied consent law.
First, Minnesota Statute section 171.177, subdivision 2 provides that
test refusal is only actionable where a driver refuses to take both a blood
and urine test. 212 This “choice of test” option is provided to accommodate
drivers who may have a “reasonable aversion to giving a blood or urine

205
206
207

Id.
Id.
Id.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016).
State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016).
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Id. § 171.177, subdiv. 2 (“If the person to whom the test is directed objects to the test, the
officer shall offer the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may be taken
against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if a urine test was offered and action
may be taken against a person who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was
offered.”);
see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 4 (2019) (stating the same rule but clarifying that
this limitation does not apply to an unconscious person).
208
209
210
211
212
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sample.” 213 Offering drivers this choice could be reasonable if the two tests
produce equally reliable results. However, blood and urine tests are far from
equivalent. Because urine test results are consistently less accurate than
blood test results, most states find urine test results inadmissible in DWI
proceedings. 214 In fact, only eleven states, including Minnesota, admit urine
testing in DWI prosecutions. 215 Despite the fact that most studies
demonstrate that urine alcohol concentrations do not correlate well with
BACs, the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld the validity and use of
urine alcohol concentrations. 216 Although they may be admissible, expert
DWI defense attorneys advise drivers to choose urine tests over blood tests
because they are most likely to be deemed inadmissible. 217
Second, Minnesota Statute section 171.177, subdivision 13 prohibits
law enforcement from executing a search warrant if the driver refuses to
submit to the warranted chemical test. 218 Essentially, this provision requires
the driver’s consent before the search warrant can be lawfully executed. By
including this provision in the statute, the legislature effectively constructed
a novel power that now allows drivers to prevent the execution of a judicial
order. Not only is this additional requirement unique to search warrants
executed under this statute, but it also contradicts the very nature of search
warrants.
The Minnesota Legislature has defined a search warrant as an “order
in writing, in the name of the state, signed by a court other than a court
exercising probate jurisdiction, directed to a peace officer, commanding the
peace officer to make a search as authorized by law and hold any item
seized, subject to the order of a court.” 219 However, under Minnesota Statute
section 171.177, subdivision 13, a search warrant does not hold the same
meaning because it no longer commands a police officer to execute the
lawfully authorized search but rather requires law enforcement to obtain a
driver’s consent first.
State v. Hagen, 529 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Franko v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 432 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).
Robert H. Williams & Jerrold B. Leikin, Medicolegal Issues and Specimen Collection for
Ethanol Testing, 30 LABORATORY MEDICINE 530, 534 (1999).
Maury D. Beaulier, Winning DWI: Challenging the Urine Test, HG.ORG
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/winning-dwi-challenging-the-urine-test-7973
[https://perma.cc/A4EM-FSDZ].
Williams & Leikin, supra note 214, at 534 (“Some physicians may use this [urine/blood]
ratio to estimate BAC in a clinical or emergency setting. However, it should never be used
to calculate a BAC for medicolegal purposes.”).
Beaulier, supra note 215.
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 626.05, subdiv. 1 (2019) (emphasis added).
213

214

215

216

217
218
219

396

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

Lastly, refusal to submit to the warranted chemical testing constitutes
an independent criminal charge. 220 In every other context, “obstructing legal
process” is the criminal charge that attaches to refusal to comply with a
search warrant. 221 Yet, pursuant to subdivision 13(b), chemical test refusal is
not criminally punishable as obstructing legal process unless it involves the
use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence. 222 There is no valid
rationale for the distinction between the respective legal ramifications. The
imposition of differing charges further exemplifies the peculiar role search
warrants play in the implied consent law context, pursuant to section
171.177.
A more sensical statute would impose the search warrant
requirement for chemical testing of fluid samples, but would omit the
aforementioned provisions that provide the driver with the ability to control
which test is administered, limit the execution of the search warrant, and
prevent law enforcement from obtaining the fluid samples. Without these
provisions, any refusal to comply with the search warrant would be treated
as obstructing legal process, rather than chemical testing refusal. The
omission of these provisions would eliminate any confusion regarding a
driver’s limited right to counsel because in the typical search warrant
situation, Minnesota’s Constitution does not provide the subject of a search
warrant with the right to counsel. However, the current statute provides no
clarity concerning the limited right to counsel. In fact, it creates a new
situation, one which should afford drivers the limited right to counsel based
on the court’s reasoning in Friedman.

B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Got It Wrong
In Rosenbush, the court overlooked the existence of the same
fundamental concerns that supported its decision to afford accused drivers

See MINN. STAT. § 169A.26, subdiv. 1(b) (2018) (criminalizing refusal to submit to
chemical test as a third-degree DWI).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.50, subdiv. 2 (2019) (stating that if the violation did not
“create[] a risk of death, substantial bodily harm, or serious property damage” and was not
“accompanied by force or violence or the threat thereof,” the violation is punishable by
“imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000”),
with MINN. STAT. § 169A.26, subdiv. 1(b) (2019) (pronouncing that a refusal to submit to
chemical testing constitutes a third degree DWI and is punishable by up to one year in prison
and a $3,000 fine).
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13(b) (2019) (“A refusal to submit to a[n alcohol
concentration] test does not constitute a violation of section 609.50 [obstructing legal
process], unless the refusal was accompanied by force or violence or the threat of force or
violence.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1 (2019).
220

221

222
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the limited right to counsel in Friedman. 223 After Rosenbush was arrested,
the officer presented her with a search warrant for her blood sample and
informed her that refusal is a crime. 224 At that moment, she was faced with a
unique choice that would follow her through subsequent criminal
proceedings. Namely, she was forced to determine whether it would be in
her best interest to submit a blood sample for chemical testing purposes and
possibly give the police not only incriminating evidence—but potentially
provide the police with proof of her guilt—or decline to submit to the
chemical testing and suffer the consequences of refusal. In Friedman, the
court found that the “Minnesota Constitution protects the individual’s right
to consult counsel when confronted with this decision.” 225
Despite the analogous decision involved in Rosenbush, the Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to extend the limited right to counsel to the
execution of a search warrant for a suspected impaired driver’s blood,
finding that a lawful and warranted search “adequately safeguards the
‘human rights [and] human dignity’” it was concerned with in Friedman and
“supplies meaningful ‘procedural protection for the rights of the criminally
accused.’” 226 The court is wrong. The foundation of the court’s holding is
based on the assertion that the existence of a search warrant fundamentally
changes the situation created in Friedman and thus, does not support
extending the limited right to counsel to warranted searches. 227 Specifically,
the court emphasized that the presence of a search warrant removes the
peculiarity of the decision created by the Implied Consent Advisory by
transforming it into one that every person subjected to a search warrant
faces—deciding whether to comply with the search warrant or oppose the
warrant and incur criminal penalties. 228 Thus, a driver’s decision is no longer
unique because it is one that is routinely made by every individual
State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Minn. 2019) (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“‘The
legal ramifications of the decision to submit (or not submit) to chemical testing after the
advisory reading are significant. . . . it may not be clear to a driver faced with the advisory
whether the consequences for consenting or refusing will be worse.’ We affirmed that this
‘unique decision’ and the ‘consequences that come with the reading of the advisory’ are the
reasons that drivers have a limited right to counsel when chemical testing is requested under
the implied–consent law.” (quoting State v. Hunn, 911 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 2018))).
Id. at 94 (majority opinion); see also MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019) (requiring
that “[a]t the time a blood or urine test is directed pursuant to a search warrant . . . the person
must be informed that refusal to submit to a blood or urine test is a crime”).
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 99 (quoting Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 836).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 98 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.50, subdiv. 1(1) (2019)) (making it a crime to obstruct,
hinder, or prevent a police officer from lawfully executing any legal process).
223

224

225
226
227
228
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confronted with a search warrant. 229 However, an examination of the
idiosyncrasies of the implied consent law demonstrates that the court’s
simplified analysis is lacking. 230
Although it is a criminal offense to “obstruct, hinder, or prevent a
police officer from lawfully executing any legal process,” 231 police are
permitted to continue executing the warranted search warrant despite a
subject’s failure to comply. 232 In executing the search, officers may not only
detain individuals without violating the Fourth Amendment, but are also
permitted to use reasonable force to execute the warrant when faced with
defiance. 233 As the dissent recognized, the implied consent law is sui
generis. 234 Distinct from the execution of warrants in every other context, the
implied consent law essentially requires the driver’s consent prior to
executing the warrant for blood or urine. 235 Where a driver refuses to submit
to the warrant, Minnesota Statute section 171.177, subdivision 13 expressly
prohibits law enforcement’s execution of the warrant. 236 Although refusal to
comply with the search warrant carries independent criminal charges, this
provision in the implied consent statute allows a driver to effectively ensure
that law enforcement will not obtain his or her blood or urine. Similar to
the implied consent law, failure to comply with search warrants in all other
contexts may constitute an actionable criminal offense. However, the crucial
distinction is that failure to comply in other contexts does not prevent law
enforcement from obtaining the object of the warrant. Thus, the decision to
submit to warranted chemical testing is not the same as the decision to

229
230
231

Id.
Id. at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
See MINN. STAT. § 609.50 (2019) (imposing either misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or

felony charges on individuals who obstruct legal process).
See State v. Young, No. C4-03-375, 2003 WL 22999377, at *3–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2003).
MINN. STAT. § 609.06, subdiv. 1 (2019); see also Young, 2003 WL 22999377, at *10
(finding the officer’s deadly use of force against an individual resisting the officer’s execution
of the warrant was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances); Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight. . . . [T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an
objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.”) (citations omitted).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2019).
Id. (“If a person refuses to permit a blood or urine test as required by a search warrant . .
. then a test must not be given.”).
232

233

234
235
236
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comply with a search warrant. 237 The court missed a crucial component of
its analysis by overlooking the significant distinction of these decisions and
erred in its conclusion that the decision encountered by drivers under the
implied consent law is no longer “unique” based on the presence of a search
warrant.
The court further justified its holding based on the assertion that the
presence of a search warrant resolves the concerns that led to its holding in
Friedman. 238 The court determined that a search warrant transforms the
encounter with law enforcement so that the “driver is not ‘meeting his
adversary’ in the same manner as the driver in Friedman because a neutral
judicial officer has determined that the police may lawfully obtain a sample
of the driver’s blood.” 239 However, the driver must consent to the search in
order for the officer to execute the warrant. Thus, before the officer may
lawfully obtain a sample of the driver’s blood, the driver is confronted with
the same decision as in Friedman: comply or not comply with the warrant.
The addition of the search warrant requirement did not eliminate, nor
reduce, the uniqueness of a driver’s choice; it merely created an additional
procedural step law enforcement must take under the implied consent law.
The court next found that the legislative “changes to Minnesota’s
Impaired Driving Code have made a driver’s choice less meaningful” based
on the similar penalties imposed by test refusal and test failure. 240 Because
the penalties are similar, the utility of counsel is diminished in this situation
because “little explanation of the ‘alternative choices’ and ‘legal
ramifications’ is necessary.” 241 Not only are the consequences attached to the
decision more severe today than they were when Friedman was decided, 242
but Minnesota’s Impaired Driving Code is significantly more complicated

Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 101 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (“Regardless of the presence of a
warrant, the implied-consent law continues to require drivers to make a unique decision and,
therefore, should trigger the limited right to counsel announced in Friedman.”).
Id. at 99 (majority opinion) (“[T]he presence of a warrant ameliorates the concerns that
we articulated in Friedman.”); see also Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d
828, 833 (Minn. 1991) (indicating concern for a driver’s need for an objective advisor to
explain alternative choices and legal ramifications arising from the decision to refuse or allow
a chemical test).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 98 (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833).
Id. at 98–99. Compare MINN. STAT. § 169A.26 (2019) (making refusal to submit to a
chemical test a gross misdemeanor if no aggravating factors are present), with MINN. STAT.
§ 169A.27 (2019) (making DWI a misdemeanor if no aggravating factors are present).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 98–99 (citing Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833).
When Friedman was decided, the consequence for test refusal was limited to civil license
revocation. At that time, a driver’s license was suspended for 90 days for test failure and one
year for refusal to submit to the chemical test. MINN. STAT. § 169.123 subdiv. 4 (1990).
237

238

239
240

241
242

400

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:3

now than it was when Friedman was decided. 243 As of July 1, 2017,
Minnesota’s Impaired Driving Code takes up forty-six pages of criminal
code, filled with legal intricacies unknown to the layman. As Rosenbush
argued, “[i]f ever someone needed the assistance of counsel, it would be to
explain that despite a court order compelling a police officer to secure a
sample of their blood, they could render the order toothless simply by
uttering the word ‘no.’” 244 Yet, despite the new imposition of criminal
consequences for refusal and the increased complexities of the DWI law,
the court determined that the presence of a search warrant and the reading
of the condensed advisory adequately inform and equip drivers to make this
decision without the aid of counsel. Perhaps the procedural protection of a
search warrant and an explanatory advisory would be capable of
safeguarding the rights of a driver suspected of DWI, but the protections
provided by the current application of the two shields is clearly inadequate.

C. Inadequate Fluid Test Advisory
In 2017, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statute
section 171.177 and amended the implied consent statute. The pertinent
modifications regarding the procedural requirements of obtaining blood
and urine samples for chemical testing purposes under the new laws are the
fluid-test advisory and the addition of the search warrant requirement. 245
Similar to the statutory amendments made in response to the Friedman
holding, the Legislature effectively omitted relevant information from the
fluid-test advisory. 246 The breath test advisory continues to require police
When Friedman was decided, the consequences for test refusal were limited to the civil
sanction of license revocation. Id. At that time, that DWI statute and the implied consent
statute made up less than ten pages of criminal code. See id. at §§ 169.121–.1231. Today,
Minnesota’s Impaired Driving Code is forty-six pages long. Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 88.
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 21.
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 97.
Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 517 N.W.2d 901, 902 (Minn. 1994) (“Before Friedman
the statutory standard advisory informed each DWI arrestee, among other things: (a)
Minnesota law requires that the person take a test to determine if the person is under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (b) if the person refuses testing, the person’s
driver’s license will be revoked for at least one year; (c) if the test is taken and the results
show an alcohol concentration of .10 or more, the person’s driver’s license will be revoked
for at least 90 days; (d) whether the test is taken or refused, the person may be subject to
criminal penalties for DWI; (e) after testing the person may consult with an attorney; (f) after
testing the person has the right to obtain additional testing, while in custody, by someone of
the person’s choosing; and (g) the refusal to take a test may be offered in evidence against
the person at trial. Following Friedman . . . the legislature dropped (b), (c), (d), (f), and (g)
from the old advisory.”).
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officers to inform drivers of the limited right to counsel, the blood and urine
test advisory only requires police to inform drivers that “refusal to submit to
a blood or urine test is a crime.” 247 Although the right to counsel announced
in Friedman was subsequently codified in statute, it is a constitutional
requirement. 248 A constitutional requirement cannot be eliminated through
legislation. Thus, the court’s focus on the application of these legislative
changes in relation to the right to counsel under the implied consent law are
misplaced.
In Davis, the constitutionality of the 1993 amendments to the Implied
Consent Advisory were challenged. Despite the court’s concerns regarding
the “deficiencies of the current advisory,” it ultimately upheld the legislative
amendments, concluding “[o]nce the supreme court announced the limited
right to counsel in Friedman, the legislature had the power to shift from the
police officer to the attorney the burden of informing the driver about the
details of rights and sanctions under the implied consent law.” 249 As
Rosenbush argued:
Remembering that the truncated implied consent advisory was
only upheld against a due process challenge in Davis because it
was supplemented by the right to discuss the missing information
with an attorney, this new statute is constitutionally unsound
where it provides only a single crumb of information regarding a
driver’s rights and obligations, while at the same time depriving
the driver of the right to legal consultation - what the court of
appeals referred to as Friedman’s “main protection.” 250
The truncated advisory mandated by the new implied consent law,
coupled with the court’s decision in Rosenbush, infringes upon a suspected
driver’s right to obtain full and accurate information concerning the
decision, its alternatives, and the legal ramifications involved. In 1991, when
the Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized the state constitutional right
to consult with counsel before submitting to a chemical test, the Implied
Consent Advisory encompassed specific and comprehensive explanations
MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.51, subdiv. 2, 171.177, subdiv. 1 (2019). As Rosenbush argued,
“There is no justification for either the legislature or the courts to treat those being asked to
submit to a fluid test any differently than those being asked to submit to a breath test. By
doing so, both the legislature and the court of appeals have ignored this court’s directive that
the Minnesota Constitution affords all drivers being asked to make a choice about submitting
to impaired driving testing the limited right to consult with an attorney before doing so.”
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 23.
See Comm’r of Pub. Safety v. Campbell, 494 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Minn. 1992) (recognizing
that the limited right to counsel recognized in Friedman is based on the right under the state
constitution rather than statutory rights).
Davis, 517 N.W.2d at 902–04.
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 25–26.
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of the obligation and consequences of either taking or refusing a test. 251 At
that time, a driver had the right to consult with counsel, but only after
deciding to submit to the chemical test. 252 Despite the informative advisory
and the federal precedent—holding that drivers had no federal constitutional
right to assistance of counsel at this stage of the process—the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that drivers had the right, under Minnesota’s state
constitution, to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to
the chemical test. 253 Ultimately, the court stated:
[W]e hold that the point at which an individual is asked by law
enforcement officials to undergo a blood alcohol test constitutes
a critical stage in the criminal process and that article I, section 6
of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees an individual in such a
situation the limited right to counsel within a reasonable time
before submitting to testing[.] 254
As Rosenbush correctly pointed out, the same five conditions 255 that
urged the Minnesota Supreme Court to oppose statutory provisions and
afford drivers the right to a pre-test consultation are even more important
today, under Minnesota Statute section 171.177. 256 Now, drivers are forced
to rely on the information provided by the advisory because they no longer
have the limited right to counsel. When Rosenbush was confronted with the
critical and binding decision concerning compliance with the search

MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1990). The advisory informed drivers that Minnesota law required
them to submit to a test of blood, breath, or urine to determine if they were under the
influence of alcohol and that their licenses would be revoked for a specified period of time
if the results were greater than 0.10. Additionally, they were informed that refusal to comply
with the test request would increase the period their license would be revoked, and they may
face criminal prosecution if they had prior alcohol-related license revocation on record.
Refusal could be used as evidence against them in a criminal trial. Finally, drivers were
informed that they had the right to obtain an additional test at their own expense while in
custody and could consult with an attorney, but only after deciding to submit to the state’s
test.

251

252

Id.

253

Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833–34 (Minn. 1991).

254

Id. at 837.

The five conditions are:
1. Drivers had no constitutional right to refuse a test of any sort; 2. Drivers had the statutory
option to refuse a test, despite having no constitutional right to do so; 3. If the driver refused
a test, none would be administered; 4. Drivers could be prosecuted for refusing to submit to
a test; and 5. The Commissioner of Public Safety would take immediate, pre–hearing action
against the driver’s license of any driver who either failed or refused a test.
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 171, at 18–19.
Id. at 21.
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warrant, the only information she was afforded came from the deputy. 257
After serving Rosenbush with the warrant for her blood, the deputy
informed her that failure to submit to the test is a crime. 258 Not only was this
information insufficient, it was also inaccurate. Minnesota Statute section
171.177, subdivision 2 states:
If the warrant authorizes either a blood or urine test, the officer
may direct whether the test is of blood or urine. If the person to
whom the test is directed objects to the test, the officer shall offer
the person an alternative test of either blood or urine. Action may
be taken against a person who refuses to take a blood test only if
a urine test was offered and action may be taken against a person
who refuses to take a urine test only if a blood test was offered. 259
Rosenbush could not have been prosecuted for the crime of test refusal
based solely on failure to comply with the search warrant for a blood sample.
For Rosenbush’s failure to submit to constitute a criminal offense, she
would have had to refuse to comply not only with the blood test, but also
with a urine test. Because the search warrant only authorized the search of
Rosenbush’s blood, the deputy would have had to apply for a subsequent
search warrant for Rosenbush’s urine and request that she submit to the
urine test. 260 Rosenbush’s refusal to comply with the search warrant would
only become a crime upon her failure to submit to the subsequent urine
test. 261 Not only was the advisory, as stated in Minnesota Statute section
171.177, subdivision 1 inadequate, it arguably violated Rosenbush’s due
process rights. 262 This problem is not unique to Rosenbush’s situation, but
could happen whenever a search warrant limits the search to obtaining only
one of the two applicable fluid samples.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously recognized that “[a]n attorney, not a police
officer, is the appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney functions as an objective advisor
who could explain the alternative choices.” Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833.
State v. Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 2019).
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 2 (2019).
Although it is possible for a search warrant to specify blood and/or urine, the search warrant
involved in Rosenbush was only for a blood sample. See Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 93.
MINN. STAT. § 171.177, subdiv. 13 (2019); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 88.
In determining that a license revocation violated due process rights, the court in
McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1991) relied on the
three elements from Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety:
(1) the person whose license was revoked submitted to a breath, blood, or urine test; (2) the
person prejudicially relied on the implied consent advisory in deciding to undergo testing;
and (3) the implied consent advisory did not accurately inform the person of the legal
consequences of refusing to submit to the testing.
911 N.W.2d 506, 508–09 (Minn. 2018).
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An additional shortcoming of the advisory is that it fails to inform
suspected drivers that failure to submit is potentially a more serious offense
with more severe consequences than a DWI conviction. There are plausible
circumstances where a driver suspected of DWI might think it advantageous
to refuse the chemical testing in order to decrease the possibility of criminal
DWI conviction. 263 To a layman, conviction for chemical test refusal may
seem less severe than DWI conviction. However, to the contrary, first-time
test refusal carries more severe consequences than first-time test failure. 264 A
driver’s first-time test failure constitutes a misdemeanor offense, which may
result in a $1000 fine and a 90-day jail sentence, 265 whereas a driver’s firsttime test refusal constitutes a gross misdemeanor and can result in a $3000
fine and potentially one year in prison. 266 Without knowledge of, or access
to, this information, drivers like Rosenbush are forced to make ill-informed
decisions that could carry significant consequences throughout subsequent
criminal proceedings. As Justice Hudson stated, “A search warrant will not
give drivers ‘aid in coping with legal problems,’ and will not stop their
decisions from ‘impair[ing] defense on the merits’ if they submit to
testing.” 267 Drivers suspected of DWI require an objective advisor to explain
the differing legal ramifications of the choices. Because neither the advisory
nor the search warrant can adequately fulfil this need, Minnesota’s state
constitutional limited right to counsel, recognized in Friedman, should
apply when a driver is asked to submit to warranted chemical testing.
It is important to note that the purpose behind the implied-consent
advisory is to “inform a driver of the serious consequences of refusal in an

In Prideaux, the court recognized, “depending upon the individual driver’s circumstances,
the decreased possibility of criminal conviction may be worth the 6-month loss of his license
if he does not depend on his driver’s license for his livelihood.” Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1976). Although the current legal ramifications
associated with test refusal are different from when Prideaux was decided, the reasoning
behind the court’s analysis still applies.
MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.26–.27 (2019); Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 102 (Hudson, J.,
dissenting) (“[F]irst-time test refusal is a gross misdemeanor and first-time test failure is a
misdemeanor when no aggravating factors are present.”).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, subdiv. 12 (2019) (defining “misdemeanor”); Rosenbush, 931
N.W.2d at 102 (“A driver who submits to a test but fails is subject to a 90-day license
revocation if no aggravating circumstances are present.” (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.52,
subdiv. 4(a)(1) (2018))).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.03, subdiv. 8 (2019) (defining “gross misdemeanor”); Rosenbush,
931 N.W.2d at 103 (“[A] driver who refuses a [chemical] test is subject to a 1-year [license]
revocation.” (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 3(a)(1) (2018))).
Rosenbush, 931 N.W.2d at 102.
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effort to compel the driver to take the test.” 268 At a time when civil license
revocation was the only consequence associated with test refusal, the Scott
court stated, “[w]hen compared to the 90-day minimum revocation for
taking but failing the test, the civil consequences strongly compel the driver
to take the test.” 269 Now, despite the increased severity of the consequences
associated with refusal, the persuasive pressures urging compliance lose
effect because drivers are not given full information, nor the opportunity to
consult with counsel. The State argued that affording drivers a limited right
to counsel in this context “implies that counsel would not only advise a
suspect to violate the law by refusing a test, but [] also [] provide[s] the
opportunity to advise suspects to ignore a court order.” 270 That simply is not
true. In fact, the underlying purpose of the advisory—encourage
compliance—is actually strengthened by the presence of counsel. Lawyers
must abide by ethical duties and obligations, one of which prohibits counsel
from advising a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct. 271 Instead
of advising drivers to refuse to comply with the search warrant, lawyers
provide clarity regarding the severe consequences of test refusal, which may
not be generally known by a driver. Thus, drivers are arguably more likely
to comply with the search warrant when they are afforded complete and
accurate information by a trusted counselor. For example, in Friedman, the
suspected driver, confused by the advisory, requested to speak with
counsel. 272 She was informed that she could only speak to counsel after
deciding whether she would submit. 273 After refusing to submit to the
chemical test, she called her lawyer. 274 He informed her that it would be in

State v. Mike, 919 N.W.2d 103, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018); see also Tyler v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 1985) (“The advisory is not designed to persuade
a driver not to take a test; rather, it is aimed at letting a driver know the serious consequences
of his refusal to take a test.”) (emphasis added); State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
Scott, 473 N.W.2d at 377 (“[T]he purpose of the implied consent advisory is to inform
the driver of the serious consequences of his or her refusal. The onerous civil consequence
of license revocation is designed to induce the driver to submit to testing. . . . When
compared to the 90-day minimum revocation for taking but failing the test, the civil
consequences strongly compel the driver to take the test.”).
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 160, at 18.
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) prohibits lawyers from “counsel[ing]
a client to engage . . . in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal . . . but a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client . . . .” MINN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (1985).
Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 1991).
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her best interest to submit to the chemical test. 275 However, by the time she
obtained that information from counsel, the officers had already charged
her with refusal. 276 If the purpose of the implied-consent advisory actually is
to encourage compliance and decrease refusal rates, it would be
advantageous to allow drivers to speak with an attorney who can explain just
how significant the consequences of refusal are. 277
V. CONCLUSION
The existence of the search warrant and the insufficient advisory were
incapable of protecting Rosenbush’s rights. However, the presence of
counsel would have ensured that Rosenbush obtained the full information
concerning her rights, obligations, and procedures. As the court previously
and correctly acknowledged, “[a]n attorney, not a police officer, is the
appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney functions as an objective
advisor who could explain the alternative choices” and the legal
ramifications. 278 Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the “foundation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is based on
the traditional role of an attorney as a legal expert and strategist,” 279 the
Minnesota Supreme Court essentially replaces the role of counsel in the
limited right to counsel context with the combination of a search warrant
and the reading of an advisory that can be stated in a mere six words.

275
276
277

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Nyflot v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. 1985) (showing

the attorney advised suspected driver to submit to the chemical test, but the police officer
refused to let her submit because her decision to refuse was final).
Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 293 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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